The presence of wireless communication grows undeniably more prevalent each year. and provide a comprehensive security analysis and discussion to determine whether it has addressed 10 the vulnerabilities of its predecessor. An interesting finding of this paper is that WPA3 still lacks to 11 address all the issues existed in WPA2 and explore other mitigations for future research. 
86
The 128-bit per packet key is dynamically generated for every packet. WPA is separated into 87 WPA-Personal or WPA-PSK (Pre-Shared Key) and WPA-Enterprise. The PSK is a static key used 88 to initiate communication between two parties. In WPA-Personal a 256-bit key is used to authenticate 89 the wireless devices, which is never transmitted over the air. The MIC key and encryption key are 90 derived from the PSK.
91
TKIP was created to fix the security problems with WEP. It is a collection of algorithms that 92 resolves the issue of having most of the cryptographic functions occurring in hardware. TKIP uses an 93 RC4 device (implemented in the hardware of a wireless network adapter) to alter the way the shared 94 key is used. WEP uses a shared key in encryption, while TKIP uses a shared key to generate other keys.
95
A major benefit of TKIP is that no additional hardware is required for implementation. TKIP made four 96 improvements to WEP: (1) it encrypted the message integrity code (MIC) to prevent falsifications, (2) 97 used Strict IV sequence to prevent replay attacks, (3) used improved key generation, and (4) refreshed 98 keys to prevent key repetition attacks [17] .
99
TKIP keys are used after a client is authenticated and associated. A 4-way handshake is performed 100 using the TKIP keys resulting in a 512-bit key that is shared between the client and the access point. A The data packet concatenated with the MIC is then encapsulated using WEP so it can be 106 implemented on old WEP hardware. An ICV is appended then the packet is encrypted using RC4 and 107 a key that uses the function that combines the temporal key, transmitter MAC address, and the TKIP 108 Sequence Counter (TSC). The receiver will check to see if the TSC is in order and the ICV is correct. If 109 either of these checks are not valid, the frame will be dropped. The original data packet is reassembled, 110 and the MIC value is verified. If it is accepted the TSC replay counter is updated [19] . processing demands [20] . In order to generate keys in WPA2, a 4-way handshake is needed to get a 127 Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) and a Group Temporal Key (GTK), as well as a Group Key handshake 128 for GTK renewal or host dissociation [17] .
129
In the beginning of the handshake, as depicted in Fig. 2 , both the client and AP have a Pairwise
130
Master Key (PMK), which is a PBDKF2 function of the PSK, the SSID of the AP, and an HMAC function.
131
After the client sends a request to connect and the AP acknowledges the request, the AP will generate 132 a nonce (Anonce) and send it to the client. A nonce is a random value that is known by the sender to 133 test that the receiver knows a certain piece of information. The client is tested by using the nonce along 134 with some other information to create a new value that the AP can test. To create the PTK, the client 135 will generate its own nonce (Snonce) and concatenate that with the Anonce, the PMK, and the MAC 136 address of both AP and client. Part of this key is used to derive the MIC, to ensure that the Snonce problem lies with a lack of encryption and authentication to maintain authenticity of the messages. 
Attack Flow

215
In this section we will describe the main attacks an adversary can perform against a victim client 216 on a Wi-Fi network using WPA2-PSK security. To clearly identify all weaknesses in the design of current
217
Wi-Fi networks we have created a flow chart that walks the reader through the steps taken by the 218 attacker to achieve the desired outcomes, shown in Fig. 4 give references to the states or outcomes they lead to. For a client to connect to an AP, the AP must first trust that the client is allowed to join the network 256 and give it the key that will be used in encryption of data. This trust is created and authenticated using 257 the 4-way handshake.
258
In this protocol, the client and the AP will communicate certain information to each other so that 259 the other can create several keys individually to arrive at an agreed upon key, the PTK, which will 260 be the fresh session key used for safe encrypted data transmission for that particular connection. For
261
each new connection made between the client and AP, a new PTK will be created for encryption. This 262 prevents a one-time derivation of the PTK by an adversary for decryption of future traffic.
263
To perform the off-line dictionary attack, the attacker will passively monitor the air for packets 264 going from a client to an AP. Being that Wi-Fi connection uses frequencies and sends information 265 through the air, an adversary can eavesdrop the packets destined for a specific AP and capture them.
266
The only components of this exchange making the connection and PTK fresh is the random nonces This process is repeated for every word in a wordlist until the correct passphrase is found [26] . performed without needing to capture a handshake between another client and an AP.
280
The attack exploits the Robust Security Network Information Element (RSN) of a single EAPOL 281 frame. This EAPOL frame is received upon the Authentication phase of connection right before the 282 4-way handshake (see Fig. 2 ). After examination of the captured frame using a packet capturing tool
283
(e.g. Wireshark), the RSN PMKID can be seen under the WPA Key Data section as a hash value. The 284 PMKID is calculated as:
where the PMK is the key to the function and the data part is a fixed string PMK Name, the MAC Another common practice is to trick the client into thinking they are connecting to a genuine AP, 343 while they are actually connecting to a rogue AP. This is a variant of the Rogue AP attack known as 344 the Evil Twin attack. The attacker impersonates a specific AP, in hopes that a user will connect to it.
345
Once the user connects to the malicious AP, the attacker will be a man-in-the-middle (MITM) and 346 will be able to decrypt, see, and manipulate traffic that the user is receiving and sending from their 347 device. The attacker will forward Internet access to the user, so the user will get what they want and 348 not suspect anything, but the attacker acts as a proxy which views all data first.
349
This is a problem for users that want to access the Internet in public areas such as coffee shops, simply imitating features of a valid AP to trick a connecting device.
363
Executing this attack ten years ago may have been easier than it is today due to human error.
364
Many newer models of Wi-Fi enabled devices implement the preferred networks feature which allows 365 the device to connect automatically to certain networks once the first handshake has been made. This 366 will stop the user from making a mistake and choosing the wrong network to connect to manually.
367
However, an attacker can trick the device into choosing the wrong network automatically by exploiting 368 signal strength.
369
Since all that is needed is the SSID and MAC address to be the same to trick the device, the 
401
The CCMP encryption method is said to be highly secure due to its use of the AES-CTR encryption.
402
As mentioned earlier, this algorithm makes it extremely difficult for any computer to crack, impossible
403
with the technology at the writing of this paper. However, there is another step in this algorithm that other parameters using AES, as shown in Fig. 3 .
407
The vulnerability in this scheme is present in the last XOR step. There is a fundamental, 408 mathematical property of logical flow that makes the KRACK exploit possible. To create the Encrypted 409 text E, the Plaintext P is XORed with the Keystream KS to yield the formula:
If an adversary were to capture two encrypted packets, he might be able to use these two packets 411 to decipher them. Given that the Key Streams are the same, an adversary could XOR the two Encrypted 412 texts together to cancel out the Key Streams and leave the two Plaintexts.
413
Given:
Then:
If the adversary were to be able guess or know P 1 , then it is possible to decrypt P 2 . This can be 416 done using a default known first messages that the AP or client will send upon connection. The WPA2
417
keystream is designed to change so that this exploit does not happen, but the KRACK researchers installed on the client side, the client can begin sending data packets and encrypt using the CCMP 427 scheme shown in Fig. 3 . The first message sent after this key installation will have a packet number of 428 1. The AP will then know to decrypt the first incoming packet using the PTK and packet number 1.
429
They both then increment their packet number for the next packet sent.
430
This protocol, however, has a function designed to make the system more efficient, but results in IP address and MAC address so that the client will be sure to acknowledge whom he is speaking with.
471
The other hosts will then send back ARP response packets identifying their IP and MAC addresses.
472
ARP will then form a table in which it will associate all the IP address with the MAC addresses which 473 it learned.
474
The main drawback of the ARP protocol is that it does not have any authentication procedure 475 before it is accepted into the 
525
The client sends an HTTPS request for a webpage over the Internet, which is then received by the 526 webserver who sends back the webpage with an encrypted SSL tunnel. If an attacker is proxying all 527 this traffic, however, he can alter the request for an HTTP webpage, instead of an HTTPS webpage.
528
The webpage stays the same, but the protocol being used lacks that extra layer of encryption between 529 the host and the webserver. Once the client receives the HTTP page, they will try to authenticate 530 with the webserver using his credentials, those credentials are in plain text and they are captured 531 by the attacker. The attacker will initiate a new HTTPS session using these credentials to the HTTPS 532 server. Then, the server will think that this connection is legitimate and accept it. 
560
This resistance is achieved using a Dragonfly Handshake to leverage discrete logarithmic and elliptic 561 curve cryptography. The result of the handshake generates a PMK, which is then used in the standard 562 4-way handshake used in the WPA2 scheme.
563
The SAE protocol only uses the shared password for authentication, not for deriving the PMK. In 564 the dragonfly protocol, a Password Element PE is used instead of the password for computing keys.
565
The PE is determined at the time of the session, using an agreed upon set of elliptic curve parameters 566 p, which is a large prime number used to determine the prime field for the elliptic curve, and q, which
567
is another large prime number in the order of a group G. agreed upon by the client and AP using 568 discrete logarithmic computation and a hunting-and-pecking technique with the password as a seed is derived, both parties will then generate a private r and mask m, which are randomly chosen large 573 numbers in the range {1...q}. They will then use those values to calculate a scalar s, and along with the 574 PE calculate an element E using the given Eqs. (7) and (8): The ss calculated will then be used to derive the key confirmation key kck and the master key mk.
579
The kck will be put into a hash function, concatenated with the sender's scalar, the receiver's scalar, the 580 sender's element, the receiver's element, and the identity (in this case MAC address) of the sender to 581 confirm that the sender has calculated the correct ss, and therefore has knowledge of the password.
This confirmation message will be calculated on both sides in messages 3 and 4 with corresponding 583 variables for the sender. The order of concatenation and inclusion of corresponding identity adds 584 authenticity to the message to avoid replay of the other party's message. Finally, mk will be used as 585 the PMK in the 802.11i 4-way handshake that follows.
586
The security of this protocol lies in the intractable nature of the dot product operation in discrete In this section we will go through each attack in an analytical fashion and determine
625
whether WPA3 provides a solution to these vulnerabilities. The format will be as follows: a brief 626 introduction to the attack will be given along with what features could be used pose a defense, the 627 assumption of the attack and attacker, and the proof, which will either support or reject the assumption. Here we will show how WPA3 provides protection to De-authentication attacks with the addition 631 of PMF and SA (Security Association) Query. Two cases will be given, followed by a security proof of 632 the resistance. An adversary would be able to send a de-authentication frame to one or more clients spoofing the
646
MAC address of the AP to de-authenticate the client and cut connection with the AP.
647
Proof: When a client receives an unencrypted de-authentication or dissociation frame from the 648 AP who is already in session, the client will send an encrypted SA Query request to the AP and await 649 a SA Query response within the response time. The real AP will be able to answer with a protected
650
SA Query response and ignore any de-authentication frame coming in. Therefore, preforming a An adversary would not be able to able to go through a wordlist and compute a PMK that comes 658 from the dragonfly handshake to test the MIC of a PTK off-line without interacting with the AP.
659
Proof: The adversary will first try to capture messages from the dragonfly handshake, where 660 he will only obtain E A , E B , s A , and s B , as shown in Fig. 9 and defined in Eqs. (7) and (8). To obtain 661 the PMK used in the 4-way handshake, the adversary must compute the shared secret ss, defined in Rouge APs are set up to deceive the user to connect to a false router that mimics a genuine one.
684
With the use of PMF some protection is given, but this problem persists. We break down the Rouge
685
AP analysis in two sections: Key Acquisition and AP Session Hijacking. The first will describe the 686 scenario where and adversary attempts to obtain a key using a malicious AP given two cases where the 687 client is either already connected or not connected yet. The second will demonstrate how an adversary 688 attempts to hijack the session from the AP, making the client think he/she is talking to a genuine AP
689
and not a malicious AP using two techniques.
